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The Head and the Heart: Incentives and Norms 
 
by Liam Kofi Bright and Remco Heesen [1] 
 
We wager that on reflection most philosophers would reject any crude dichotomy 
[2] between reason and passion. We don’t really think Newton unweaved the rainbow, we 
don’t really think one should ignore the learn’d astronomer to go gaze at the stars - or avoid 
gazing at the stars because after all you have the star charts. One simply doesn’t have to 
choose between these ways of accessing the world, and an appreciation for what is humanly 
significant can be combined quite comfortably with an analytical frame of mind. However, in 
more sophisticated guises, something of this contrast will find its way into philosophers’ 
analyses, and we think to their detriment. This blog post is about something that seems to us 
an example of such, and we shall try to set out where we think it goes wrong and why we 
think this is important to realise. 
 
The occasion for this reflection is a recent paper [3] by Hugh Desmond [4]. It makes a rather 
interesting distinction between “economic” and “ethical” approaches to the social 
epistemology of science. The economic approach, we are told, has scientists “modeled as 
credit-maximizing agents responding to incentives such as promotion, funding, or publication 
criteria”. Whereas those who take the ethical approach understand scientists as “agents 
concerned with ideals such as honesty, respect, or reliability, and are capable of acting 
contrary to incentive structures”. Desmond seeks to show that while the economic approach 
might apparently leave the ethical approach with little to do, in fact there are sociologically 
and epistemically important aspects of science that can only be explained on the ethical 
approach. (To find out more go read his paper!) 
  
Both authors of this post are social epistemologists of science, interested in the same sort of 
issues as Desmond. One of us (Heesen) is even a major focus of discussion in Desmond's 
paper, acting as a representative [5] of the economic approach. But while finding the 
distinction interesting we do not in the end think it is a fruitful means of dividing up the 
space. Understanding why this is will help make it clear what we think social epistemology of 
the modelling sort that we have engaged in can do, how it relates to ethical projects [6] we 
are committed to, and just why we reject any hints of the dichotomy between the head and the 
heart. 
 
Consider social norms. We find social norms all over the place, applying broadly or 
narrowly, and to matters of huge importance or near triviality. It is somewhat tricky to give 
examples, as social norms are almost by definition culturally relative, but we trust that some 
of the following will ring familiar: a social norm prohibiting stealing, a (pre-covid) social 
norm in favour of shaking hands upon first meeting somebody, a social norm prescribing the 
sharing of food (in certain circumstances), a social norm prescribing the order in which to use 
pieces of cutlery at a formal dinner, a social norm against engaging in sexual relationships 
with someone other than one’s partner (if one is in a monogamous relationship), a social 
norm favouring monogamous relationships over other configurations, etc. 
 
As the name suggests, it is a constitutive part of a social norm that it has a normative 
component: endorsing a norm amounts to endorsing the claim that everyone (to whom the 
norm applies) should do what the norm prescribes – or avoid doing what the norm prohibits. 
Ideally, perhaps, one should follow norms because it is the right thing to do, not merely 
because one has an incentive to do so. Our ability to follow norms seems wrapped up with 
our ability to act with integrity, or to do things because they are what ought be done rather 
than because they are rewarded. As such, norms seem to fall on the ethical side of Desmond’s 
distinction. 
 
However, this would be too quick. Research of the past thirty years or so taking a game-
theoretic approach to social norms has yielded fascinating insights into the origins of social 
norms, the incentives individuals have to comply with norms (both in general and in specific 
circumstances), and many other factors. The work [7, 8] of Cristina Bicchieri [9] is a 
great starting point here. In using game theory, this work could be classified on the economic 
side of Desmond’s divide, but in light of the previous paragraph the reader might perhaps 
begin to see why we do not think this is the most helpful distinction. 
 
One of us (Heesen) has done some work [10] on game theory and social norms, focusing on 
the social epistemology of science, our shared area of interest with Desmond. The social 
norm under discussion there is the “communist norm” [11], which enjoins academics to share 
the results of their research freely and widely. Roughly speaking, the claim had been put 
forward that the normative/ethical side of the norm must precede the (“economic”) individual 
incentive to conform (the view [12] of Michael Strevens [13]). Whereas it was argued that the 
incentives to comply with the norm did not need independent normative foundation 
(Heesen’s view). Importantly though, both sides would agree that both aspects are 
represented in the norm as it presently exists. There was no attempt to do away with either the 
ethical or economic factors involved in this situation – the puzzle was simply about how they 
interrelate. 
 
In the case just discussed, the ethical and economic approaches cannot be neatly separated, 
and the philosophical interest is in the complex details of their interplay. This typifies the 
literature on game theory and social norms. Consider, for example, the following quote (from 
p. 40 of [8]): 
 
Some conventions may not involve externalities, at least initially, but they may 
become so well entrenched that people start attaching value to them. For example, a 
group of people may routinely avoid smoking before there arises a consensus 
disapproving this behavior. Once a public consensus is reached, smoking incurs new 
costs. Not only would one be expected not to smoke, but the occasional smoker would 
incur the blame of the entire group. At this point, a social norm is born. It may also 
happen that some conventions lend themselves to purposes they did not have when 
they were established. Norbert Elias (1978 [14]) illustrated how rules of etiquette, 
such as proper ways to eat and drink, developed to become a sign of aristocratic 
upbringing and refinement, and were effectively used to exclude those who did not 
belong to the ruling class. 
 
Again we see a complex interaction between incentives and normative expectations. To ask 
whether these phenomena should be understood in an economic fashion or an ethical fashion, 
where those are understood as rivalrous, or whether people are acting for incentive or 
normative reasons, would simply be to misunderstand what is going on. People are 
responsive to an environment containing norms against smoking, and given their desires to be 
a certain kind of person and enjoy a certain kind of normative status, the presence of the norm 
affects their incentives. There is no split to be made, it is one and the same thing we seek to 
explain, and incentives and norms do not compete with each other so much as feed into one 
another. 
 
Neither the world nor our experience of it divides into an economic component and an ethical 
component. To think so is simply to externalise the crude psychology of passion versus 
reason. Our norms permeate our social life, shaping what we want or are averse to and thus 
what we are incentivised to do – while at the same time our behaviours and desires can form 
the basis of more or less explicitly codified norms. There is no risk of modes of explanation 
stressing one or the other factor truly crowding out or replacing their opposite – or, if there is, 
it is simply the risk of philosophers and social scientists doing our job badly. To understand 
ourselves and the worlds we build together we must inevitably refer simultaneously to both 
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